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Chapter 4
Federal Civilian and Military
Retirement Systems
Edwin C. Hustead and Toni Hustead
In this chapter we describe the retirement systems that apply to civilian em-
ployees and military personnel of the U.S. federal government. More than
one out of every twenty Americans are or will be entitled to benefits under
one of the federal retirement systems. These are not only the largest retire-
ment systems in the United States, but they also supply an important part
of total retirement income now and will continue to do so in the future.
The most important federally run civilian systems are the Civil Service
Retirement System (CSRS) for employees hired before 1984, and the Fed-
eral Employees Retirement System (FERS) for employees hired after 1983.
Employees in both systems have been eligible to participate in the Federal
Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) since 1987. Most military personnel are covered by
the military retirement system - an informal name for a complex ofevolving
plans that have merged over time and cover officer and enlisted members
of the uniformed services. Prior to 1980, the military retirement benefit for-
mula provided a benefit of 50 percent of final basic pay, but benefits were
reduced in 1980 and again in 1986. As is true for state systems, the new mili-
tary and civilian benefit rules apply only to personnel entering service after
the date of the change.)
Some 97 percent of federal participants are included either in the CSRSj
FERS program or the Defense Department's military retirement system,
though there are still many (thirty-three) small retirement systems that also
fall under the federal plan heading. The number of plans and active par-
ticipants in federal plans is summarized in Table 1. Some systems, such
those covering the foreign service and judiciary, were established to fit spe-
cific types of employment. Other plans, such as Tennessee Valley Authority
and Coast Guard, were outside the authority of the sponsors of the pri-
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TABLE 1. Employees in Federal Retirement Systems (1993)
Type (number ofplans)
Civilian retirement systems
Primary civilian systems (2)
Foreign service retirement systems (2)
Judicial retirement systems (7)
Tennessee Valley Authority (I)
Federal Reserve and other bank
systems (II)
Nonappropriated fund systems and
other (9)
Subtotal (32)
Military retirement systems
Department of Defense (I)
Coast Guard (I)
Public Health Service (1)
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Agency (I)
Subtotal (4)
Total federal (36)
Type ofemployee covered
Postal Service-general
Hazardous duty
Members of Congress
Congressional staff
Military reserve technicians
Air traffic controllers
Other general
Total
Employees
covered
683,000
78,000
500
21,000
38,000
26,000
1,996,500
2,843,000
12,000
2,000
19,000
35,000
55,000
2,966,000
2,750,000
55,600
6,000
400
2,812,000
5,778,000
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office (1996), Office of Personnel Management Office of
Ac.tuaries.
mary civilian and military retirement systems. Table 1 also shows that, within
CSRS/FERS, there are special benefits for certain categories ofparticipants.
These include hazardous duty employees (such as Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation agents), air-traffic controllers, and members of Congress. The special
treatment of employees of the District of Columbia government in CSRS is
described in Hustead (this volume).
Almost all the civilian retirement systems are financed on a sound actu-
arial basis. The major exception is CSRS, which had an unfunded liability
of $504 billion in 1998 and only a portion of the liability is being amortized.
The primary military retirement system had an unfunded liability of $498
billion in 1998 but the liability is being fully amortized. The other three mili-
tary retirement systems are on a pay-as-you-go funding basis.
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The Structure of Federal Civilian
Employee Retirement Systems
Most U.S. federal civilian employees participate in the CSRS and the FERS.
The CSRS was established in 1920, before social security, and it was the natu-
ral child of the Civil Service Act of 1883, a law that protected employees
from arbitrary dismissal for any reason including age. As a consequence,
by 1920, there were many federal employees age 70 or older who could not
be separated from service. CSRS offered a legal basis for separating those
employees and the income necessary to support them after retirement. The
original Social Security Act of 1935 excluded government workers, mainly
because most had their own retirement plans. Over time, social security cov-
erage was gradually extended to government workers, and new hires in the
federal sector were brought in after 1983 (Crane this volume).
Reasons for two systems and choice. Defined benefit pension plans like CSRS
that began in the first half of the twentieth century were designed to pro-
vide reasonable retirement income for the long-career employee. Below we
provide more detail on the program, here it suffices to note that the CSRS
benefit is based on service times the high three-years average salary, with a
benefit accrual rate of 1.5 percent of pay for the first five years of service,
1.75 percent of pay for the next five years, and 2 percent ofpay for each addi-
tional year. Many federal employees at that time would work a full career
for the government, so the CSRS approach followed the pattern prevalent
in so many defined benefit plans developed at the time, offering long-term
workers high benefits, but low benefits to short-career employees. In par-
ticular, benefits for short-service younger terminating employees have little
value by age 62 because there is no inflation protection before age 62. In
fact, most terminated vested employees only receive a return of their own
contributions.
Extension of social security to federal employees hired after 1983 neces-
sitated the development of a new federal retirement system. Simply adding
social security to CSRS would have resulted in unreasonably high benefits
and cost to both the federal government and federal employees.
FERS is a three-part retirement system with benefits flowing from (a) a
defined benefit plan, (b) a defined contribution plan, and (c) social secu-
rity. At the time that FERS was under development, defined contribution
plans had become very popular in the private sector. This popUlarity de-
rived from the rapid growth of 401(k) plans, which in the private sector
permitted the deferral of taxes on contributions and investment income. Al-
though some wanted FERS to be only a defined contribution system, others
favored only the defined benefit approach. The resulting FERS design in-
corporated both a defined benefit and a defined contribution approach.
One constraint on plan design was that FERS should not cost any more than
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CSRS. FERS was launched in 1987, retroactive to 1984 for those covered by
social security.
Employment patterns when FERS was being designed differed sharply
from those pertinent in the 1920s when CSRS was developed. Increased job
mobility, downsizing, and reduced job security in recent years produced a
federal workforce with employees who were more likely to work for many
employers than to spend a full, or even a majority, of a career with one
employer. As a consequence, FERS was intended to provide more portable
benefit accumulations than CSRS. Career workers still receive the highest
benefits, but young short-service FERS workers can expect to take a much
greater share of the retirement benefits with them than CSRS workers with
the same age and service. This is particularly evident for workers leaving
prior to retirement.
CSRS employees with over five years of service at separation (before re-
tirement) can choose between a vested benefit payable at age 62 and a re-
fund of their contributions, without interest. Most separating employees
take the lump-sum refund, thereby losing money to the retirement system.
CSRS employees also lack social security coverage. By contrast, the em-
ployee covered by FERS has social security credits that are fully portable,
and separating employees with ten or more years of service may receive re-
duced benefits payable at age 55 rather than at age 62. Terminating employ-
ees are also offered a choice ofa refund ofcontributions with interest or the
deferred vested benefit in the FERS plan. But unlike in CSRS, FERS-covered
employees who take the refund do not have an opportunity to redeposit the
refund and receive credit for the prior service if they reenter federal service.2
Participants in CSRSjFERS and in many of the other civilian retirement
systems may also choose to participate in the federal TSP, which is a de-
fined contribution plan (about which more is said below). CSRS employees
can contribute up to 5 percent of pay to TSP, with no matching employer
contribution. FERS employees can contribute up to 10 percent of pay, with
the government contributing up to an additional 5 percent of pay. The TSP
began to collect and invest contributions in 1987, and most of the TSP con-
tributions are fully vested.
Historically, salaries paid to federal employees have been lower than for
similar positions in the private sector. The higher value of benefits, particu-
larly the retirement benefits, somewhat offsets the low salary level. A Hay
Group study found that FERS retirement benefits were worth 15 percent of
salary, as compared to 9 percent for other large employers. That study also
found that total federal benefits were 52 percent of salary compared to 48
percent for large employers (Hustead 1995).
Transfers from CSRS to FERS. CSRS employees have been provided with two
opportunities, or "open seasons," during which they could transfer out of
CSRS and into FERS. The first occurred in 1987 when FERS began, and the
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second was in 1998. Employees who transferred from CSRS to FERS would
be covered by social security and the FERS defined benefit system, and they
would receive matching contributions to the TSP after the date of transfer.
The CSRS benefit formula would continue to apply for service to the date
of transfer. The federal Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected that
some 40 percent of CSRS employees eligible to transfer to FERS in 1987
would have been better off by making the switch, but in fact only 5 percent
eventually transferred (CBO 1986). We estimated that around 25 percent of
those in CSRS would have been better off under FERS, but only 2 percent
transferred.
Past experience suggests that employees usually exhibit inertia and favor
their current plan when offered a choice between an old and a new retire-
ment system. For this reason it could have been anticipated that the actual
transfer rates would have been lower than the 40 and 25 percent predicted
by simply comparing the relative economic value of the two systems. Never-
theless, these transfer rates were probably too low to simply reflect inertia.
Other explanations that may be offered include employee concerns about
trading half of a guaranteed defined benefit for what they saw as risky in-
come from social security and the TSP. Concern about social security was
partly attributable to general public skepticism about the future of social
security, and also to longstanding federal union opposition to social security
coverage. Additionally, many CSRS employees were unsure about whether
they would remain in government service until they were eligible for full
retirement benefits. This was important since many employees would have
been better off under FERS if they planned on leaving government employ
prior to age 55, but would have been better off under CSRS had they been
able to remain until age 55. Finally, many CSRS employees erroneously saw
the open seasons as part of a plan by the government to move the workforce
to FERS as quickly as possible. In fact, since most employees who transferred
did so for improved benefits, the net result of each of the open seasons was
to increase retirement costs for the government.
The distrust ofFERS was clearly evidenced in a number ofcounseling ses-
sions provided by the authors during the two open seasons. In many cases,
FERS was clearly the better system for the individual but the distrust of the
new system and the perceived motivations of the employer kept the indi-
vidual from making the favorable economic decision to transfer to FERS. In
extreme cases, individuals lost over $100,000 by not transferring to FERS.
Even with the small number of transfers during the two open seasons,
FERS has grown into the dominant program as a result of its jumpstart in
1987 (it included all hires since 1983), natural attrition, and subsequent new
hires. As of the end of1998, FERS payroll exceeded halfof the total covered
payroll, and Board ofActuaries ofCSRS/FERS estimates that, by 2015, over
95 percent of employees will be covered by FERS.3
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The Civil Service Retirement System
We turn next to a discussion of CSRS benefit rules and program financing.
CSRS benefitformulas and rules.4 The CSRS uses an accrual rate based on ser-
vice times the employee's high-three years average salary. The accrual rate
is 1.5 percent of pay for the first five years of service, 1.75 percent of pay
for the next five years, and 2 percent of pay for each additional year. The
maximum benefit is 80 percent ofthe high-three average salary. Benefits are
paid in full to employees retiring at age 55 with thirty years of service, at age
60 with twenty years of service, or at age 62 with five years of service. There
is no mandatory retirement age. Employees who leave before completing
five years of service can receive a refund of their contributions with inter-
est. Those who leave with five or more years of service, but before meeting
one of these retirement conditions, can either withdraw their contributions
without interest, or receive a benefit beginning at age 62. The lower benefit
(i.e., refund without interest) for vested employees compared to non-vested
employees is a result of a series of legislative actions. When five-year vesting
was introduced vested employees were not permitted to withdraw their con-
tributions at all. The government recognized that the deferred benefit was
usually more valuable than the employee contributions so that a withdrawal
of contributions in lieu of those benefits would result in a loss of system in-
come.
The surge in federal employment that occurred during the Great Depres-
sion and World War II was followed by a reduction in employment after the
war ended. Many of the employees then leaving CSRS had more than five
years of service and complained about the restriction on withdrawing their
own contributions. Congress reacted to this pressure by permitting with-
drawal of contributions, but left a disincentive by not including interest on
those contributions. In practice, unfortunately, few vested separating em-
ployees are deterred by the lack of interest credit. The result is that most
vested employees actually receive less than what their own contributions
would have earned if they had been invested elsewhere.
CSRS provides retirement credit for military service, unless the employee
is already receiving a military retirement benefit. Retirement credit is also
provided for unused sick leave at retirement; this is applied after the 80
percent limit and, therefore, can result in a benefit greater than 80 per-
cent. Benefits are paid if the employee is disabled, to the degree that he
or she is unable to perform his or her job. The disability benefit is usually
the greater of the accrued retirement benefit and 40 percent of salary.5 The
disability benefit is discontinued if (a) the employee is found to have recov-
ered through a medical examination, (b) the employee earns 80 percent of
the salary on the former job, or (c) the employee is reemployed by the fed-
eral government. Benefits for disability resulting from Federal service are
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paid through the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP). A
disabled employee receives the higher of CSRS or OWCP benefits.
Benefits are paid to a surviving spouse and children as well as certain
former spouses ifthe employee dies in service. The surviving spouse benefit
is 55 percent of the disability benefit. For instance, the surviving spouse of
a young short-service employee receives a benefit of22 percent (55 percent
of 40 percent) of high-three salary. Additional lump sum benefits are paid
through the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance (FEGL!) program.
Survivor benefits after retirement are available in exchange for a reduc-
tion in the retiree's benefit. The reduction is 2.5 percent of the first $3,600
in annual benefit and 10 percent of the benefit above $3,600. The survivor
benefit is 55 percent of the retirement benefit before the reduction. This
differs from the private sector practice of basing the survivor benefit on the
reduced retirement benefit. The retiree can elect to provide a benefit on
a lower portion of the annuity, or to provide no survivor benefit, but this
election must be agreed to by the spouse. If the spouse predeceases the an-
nuitant, the reduction to pay for the benefit ceases and the annuitant can
later provide benefits to a second spouse by accepting a reimposition of the
reduction.
All benefits are fully indexed to inflation using the same increase formula
as under social security. This formula provides an increase every January
based on inflation in the previous year, through the third quarter of the
prior year.
CSRS employees are not covered by social security during their federal
service. If the employee is entitled to social security benefits through other
service, or through a spouse, the social security benefits can be reduced
through one of two offset provisions. (HayGroup 1999).
Financing CSRS benefits. CSRS is partially financed through a payroll tax
totaling 14 percent, flowing from employee and employee contributions of
7 percent of salary each. These contributions were increased temporarily
beginning in 1999, by as much as 0.5 percent, to reduce the federal defi-
cit; the contributions will revert to 14 percent after 2001. Nevertheless, the
14 percent of salary contribution falls far short of the CSRS normal cost,6
which is 24.2 percent of salary. Each year's shortfall is added to prior short-
falls and interest on past shortfalls, to create a substantial unfunded liability
(U.S. Office of Personnel Management [OPM) 1999a).7
The annual shortfall in CSRS financing is met through direct govern-
ment payments, which amortize part of the increased liability attributable
to salary increases, benefit liberalizations, and cost-of-living adjustments. It
also must be noted that for financing purposes, CSRS liabilities are deter-
mined on a "static" basis that does not include projection of future infla-
tion. As a result, current total contribution levels fall short offully financing
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the long-term CSRS benefits. The CSRS Board of Actuaries determines and
publishes a static unfunded liability as the basis to determine the required
government payment; this board also determines and publishes a "dynamic"
liability that considers the effect of future inflation, as its best estimate of
the actuarial status ofCSRS (OPM 1999a).
It is projected that the CSRS account will fall to zero in 2026, triggering
transfers ofFERS funds to pay CSRS annuities after 2026. Thus CSRS financ-
ing problems are slated to be covered through a fund transfer from FERS
to CSRS, when the CSRS account is depleted, as shown in Figure 1. This
Byzantine approach to financing of CSRS is a product of the legislative his-
tory of CSRS. Until 1969, the only financing of CSRS had been through the
employee and agency normal cost, then at 6.5 percent of payroll. The em-
ployee and agency contributions fell short of even the static cost of CSRS
and, of course, fell far short of the full cost of CSRS including inflation.
The financial basis of the CSRS was overhauled in 1969. First, the com-
bined employee and agency contribution was increased to approximately
equal the static normal cost of CSRS. Second, additional government pay-
ments would be made to finance the remaining static liability, but this level
of financing was to be phased in over a period of years. Both the static lia-
bility and the gradual phasing in of the new financing were selected as a
compromise to limit the impact on the budget. At the time the changes
were being debated, federal budget rules showed all increases in federal pay-
ments as increases in the federal deficit. Now, government financing of the
CSRS unfunded liability costs occurs as an intergovernmental transfer with
no impact on the overall measured federal deficit. Ironically, the move to the
current budget scorekeeping, which would have removed the controversy
from the level of CSRS financing, took place before the first additional gov-
ernment payment under the 1969 CSRS law. Ifcurrent budget scorekeeping
rules had been in effect in the 1960s, the CSRS system would undoubtedly
be funded on the same sound actuarial basis as FERS.
Even with inadequate financing, projections of the CSRS fund showed
that there would always be sufficient cashflow to pay benefits and live within
a small fund balance. In effect, benefits for current annuitants would be paid
primarily through income from employees and taxpayers. The reforms in
1969 did add a reserve cushion to CSRS financing, rather than relying solely
on pay-as-you-go financing, but even in steady state, the fund would still
have been far below the financing level required of private sector retirement
plans.
Unfortunately, any prospects for a steady state were dashed with the intro-
duction of FERS, since CSRS then lacked the needed continuous flow of
new entrants. The government's solution to this problem was to use FERS
income to pay for CSRS shortfalls. The amount borrowed from FERS would
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Figure 1. Combined CSRSjFERS fund balances. Sources: OPM (1999a) and data supplied by OPM Office
of Actuaries.
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be financed through 30-year payments beginning with each year's shortfall.
Figure 1 shows the Board of Actuaries' projections that the shortfall will
begin in 2026.
As ofSeptember 1998, OPM reported that total CSRS liabilities were $962
billion, assets were $361 billion, and the present value of future contribu-
tions was $97 billion, for a net unfunded liability of $504 billion. Plan assets
were equal to 6.6 times CSRS payroll of ($54.4 billion) and the unfunded lia-
bility was 9.3 times payroll. These determinations were made on a dynamic
basis that includes the effect offuture inflation (OPM 1999a).
In fiscal year 1998, CSRS employer and employee contributions were
$33.0 billion and investment income was $25.8 billion for total income of
$58.8 billion. Payments to CSRS annuitants totaled $41.9 billion of the total
expenditures of $42.3 billion. The annuitant payments were 77 percent of
the active participant payroll. The net result was an increase in the CSRS
account of $16.5 billion, to $360.6 billion on September 30, 1998. CSRS
covered 1,100,000 employees and paid benefits to 2,290,000 retirees and
survivors (OPM 1999a).
Figure 2 shows the increase in income and outgo of the CSRS/FERS Fund
from 1979 through 2011. While both are growing, income exceeds outgo in
all years; this will ensure a growing and viable total fund.
The Federal Employees Retirement System
We turn next to a discussion of FERS benefit rules and program financing.
FERS benefitformulas and rules. The basic FERS benefit is 1 percent of high-
three average salary per year of service, with no maximum on the benefit.
As with CSRS, the benefit is payable upon achieving one of three eligibility
requirements. Two of these, age 60 with twenty years of service and age 62
with five years of service, are the same as under CSRS. However, employ-
ees with 30 years of service must have reached a minimum retirement age
(MRA). This age is 55 for employees born prior to 1948, age 56 for those
born from 1953 to 1964, and age 57 for those born after 1969. The age in-
creases at 0.2 years per calendar year between 1948 and 1953, and between
1964 and 1969.
FERS, unlike CSRS, provides reduced early retirement benefits. Employ-
ees who have reached MRA with ten, but fewer than thirty, years of service,
can retire and receive a benefit reduced 5 percent a year under age 62. Em-
ployees who leave before MRA, with more than ten years of service, can
elect the reduced benefit when they reach MRA. Employees can also receive
a return of contributions plus interest in lieu of benefits. However, FERS
employees who elect a return of contribution cannot receive credit for that
service if they later return to federal employment.
Disability benefits are payable under the same conditions as CSRS, but
200
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Figure 2. Combined CSRS/FERS funds income and outgo. Sources: OPM (1999a) and data supplied by OPM Office
of Actuaries.
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with a design that is closer to the long-term disability approach common
in the private sector. For the first year of disability, the benefit is 60 per-
cent of high-three salary, less social security. After the first year, the bene-
fit is 40 percent of high-three pay, less 60 percent of social security. After
age 62, the annuitant receives the lesser of the pre-age-62 benefit, and a re-
computed normal retirement benefit.The normal retirement benefit is com-
puted based on service including the period of disability and a high-three
salary projected from the time of disability by inflation. The interaction with
owep benefits is the same as for eSRS.
There are two benefits payable to survivors of active employees. The first
is a lump sum payment, approximately equal to a year's salary, for employ-
ees who die after 18 months of service. In addition, a surviving spouse of an
employee who dies with more than 10 years of service receives an annuity
equal to 50 percent of the accrued FERS retirement benefit at the date of
death. FERS employees are also eligible for Federal Employees Group Life
Insurance benefits.
Retirees can elect to provide survivor benefits by taking a 10 percent re-
duction in their benefits. The survivor benefit is 50 percent of the retiree's
benefit before the 10 percent reduction. Retirees can also choose a 25 per-
cent benefit or waive the benefit entirely but any choice other than the full
50 percent benefit must be agreed to by the spouse.
FinancingFERS benefits. FERS is financed through employee contributions
of 0.8 percent of salary with the employer contributing the balance of the
normal cost. As with eSRS, these employee and agency contributions were
increased temporarily beginning in 1999 by as much as 0.5 percent to re-
duce the Federal deficit. After 2001, employee contributions will revert to
0.8 percent. The current normal cost is 11.5 percent of salary, so the em-
ploying agency contributes 10.7 percent. Unfunded liabilities are amortized
over thirty years.
The employee contribution was set at 0.8 percent so that the total con-
tribution rate for social security (currently 6.2 percent of salary) and FERS
combined was equivalent to the employee's 7 percent of salary in the eSRS.
The total retirement contribution drops to 0.8 percent when social security
contributions cease at the maximum taxable wage base ($76,200 in 2000).
This lower contribution for higher-paid employees partially offsets two fea-
tures of the FERS system that favor lower paid employees. One is the tilt
in the Social Security benefit design that provides a larger share of replace-
ment income to lower paid employees. The second is the limit on employee
contributions to the TSP.
Today there are more FERS than eSRS employee participants, but rela-
tively few retirees are currently receiving benefits; almost all contributions
are currently used to build the FERS account. In fiscal year 1998, employer
and employee contributions were $7.2 billion and investment income was
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$6.8 billion, for total income of $14.0 billion. FERS annuity payments
amounted to $0.8 billion, of the $0.9 billion total expenditure. Benefit pay-
ments were 2 percent of the total FERS payroll of $55.2 billion. The net re-
sult was an increase in the FERS fund of $13.1 billion in fiscal year 1998 to
$97 billion in September 1998. FERS covered 1,547,000 employees and paid
benefits to 106,000 retirees and survivors (OPM 1999a).
FERS, unlike CSRS, has been fully financed since it began in 1987. The
total employer and employee contribution is set equal to the normal cost,
which is determined using realistic economic assumptions. Any losses that
arise due to adverse experience must be amortized over thirty years. Before
1996, FERS had built up a small unfunded liability because of losses. How-
ever, as of September 1996, the plan showed a small surplus, which was pre-
served by the Board of Actuaries. That group affirmed that a surplus could
be held against future losses rather than credited over a thirty-year period,
but at the same time that group confirmed that a net surplus would cancel
all outstanding amortization payments. As a result, there are currently no
FERS payments beyond the normal cost. The transfers from FERS to CSRS
to cover the shortfall in financing beginning in 2026 will each be amortized
over thirty years. As a result, OPM projects future amortization payments
beginning in that year and ending thirty years after the last transfer offunds
to CSRS.
As of September 1998, the Office of the Actuary of OPM determined
that total FERS liabilities were $191 billion, assets were $97 billion, and the
present value offuture contributions was $103 billion for a funded surplus
of $8 billion. This surplus will be held as a cushion against future losses. As-
sets were 1.8 times the FERS payroll in 1998 and were projected to be 4.5
times payroll in 2070 (OPM 1999a).
Table 2 summarizes the major features of CSRS and FERS. These include
the basis for the formula, retirement conditions and cost-of-living adjust-
ment (COLA) projections. (Other features and details may be obtained
through the OPM website <www.opm.gov>.)
CSRS and FERS Governance Issues
CSRS and FERS are administered by OPM with the assistance of the federal
agencies. The Federal agencies distribute information on the retirement sys-
tems to their employees, channel agency and employee contribution to the
CSRS fund, and submit the request for retirement benefits. At retirement,
OPM determines the annuity and initiates the benefit payments, and, after
retirement, makes any changes to the annuity benefit such as the annual
COLA increase.
By law, retirement funds are invested by the Secretary of the Treasury
in federal securities. All but a small portion of the investments are in non-
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TABLE 2. Key Features ofCSRS and FERS
Full retirement benefit
Applied to
Retirement eligibility
Full unreduced benefits
Age 62 with 5 years of service
Reduced benefits
Mandatory retirement
Vested benefit
Cost-of-living increases
Employee contributions
CSRS
1.5% for the first five
years of service,
1.75% for the next
five, 2% for the rest;
maximum 80%
High-three years salary
Age 55 with 30 years of
service
Age 60 with 20 years of
service
Age 60 with 20 years of
service
None available
None
After 5 years of service,
payable at age 62
Annual increase equal
to change in con-
sumer price index
(same formula as for
social security)
7.25 percent in 1999,
7.4 percent in 2000,
7.5 percent in 2001,
7 percent after 2001
FERS
1% for all service, no
maximum
1.1 % for all service if
retired after age 60
with 20 years of
service
High-three years salary
Minimum retirement
age
(MRA) with 30 years of
service
Age 62 with 5 years of
service
MRA and 10 years of
service-reduced
5 percent for each
year under age 62
None
After 5 years of service,
payable at age 62;
after 10 years ofser-
vice a reduced bene-
fit is available at MRA
Annual increase in con-
sumer price index
(CPI) less I percent
No increase before age
62 (increase is CPI
if that is less than
2 percent and graded
if CPI between 2 and
4 percent)
1.05 percent in 1999,
1.2 percent in 2000,
1.3 percent in 2001,
0.8 percent after
2001
Source: Office of Personnel Management (1998).
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marketable bonds issued solely for the purpose of holding the retirement
funds. The special issues are created everyJune 30 for new money with ma-
turities spread over fifteen years and a yield equaling the average ofall mar-
ketable Treasury securities with four or more years till maturity. Cash bal-
ances arising during the year are held in special short-term issues maturing
on the following June 30.
Administrative costs charged to CSRSjFERS in 1997 were $102 million or
0.2 percent of total expenditures. These are only the direct costs of OPM
and do not include those ofthe employing agencies norTreasury investment
costs.
Actuarial Assumptions in CSRS and FERS
A three-member Board ofActuaries appointed by OPM is charged with set-
ting the actuarial methods and assumptions used to determine the normal
cost and unfunded liabilities of CSRS and FERS. At present the board as-
sumes that inflation will be 4 percent a year and investment return of the
CSRSjFERS fund will be 7 percent a year (OPM 1998). Salary scales are
projected to grow by 4.25 percent a year with additional individual salary
increases averaging 2.15 percent a year. Demographic rates are developed
based on plan experience. The current set of rates, adopted in 1994, in-
cludes withdrawal, involuntary retirement, voluntary retirement, and dis-
ability retirement rates. Separate mortality rates are used for active employ-
ees, non-disability annuitants, disability annuitants, and survivors.8
The Federal Thrift SaVings Plan
The TSP is a defined contribution plan of the 401(k)-type, that permits fed-
eral employees to contribute and allocate tax-deferred funds among three
investment options. The TSP is administered by the Federal Retirement
Thrift Investment Board (FRTIB) established as an independent agency by
the Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986 (FERSA).
Employees' choice of funds was restricted when the program began in
1987, but all restrictions were removed in 1991.The three funds are known as
the "G fund" or the Government Securities Investment Fund; the "F fund"
or the Fixed Income Index Investment Fund; and the "C fund" or the Com-
mon Stock Index Investment Fund. Additionally two new funds, a small-
capitalization U.S. stock (S) fund and an international stock (I) fund, will be
added in 2000.
Employees covered by FERS may contribute up to 10 percent ofsalary to
the TSP. These employees receive an automatic one percent of salary con-
tribution with variable matching on the first 5 percent of salary.9 FERS par-
ticipants are fully and immediately vested in their own as well as the govern-
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ment's matching contributions. Participants become fully vested in the one
percent automatic contribution after three years offederal service. Employ-
ees covered by CSRS can contribute up to 5 percent of salary, but there are
no government contributions. Eligible employees are provided two open
seasons each year during which they can begin to contribute, change their
contribution rate, and/or change how their contributions are invested. Bal-
ances on account may separately be transferred among the funds by partici-
pants ($10,500 in 2000).
Employee contributions are limited by the elective deferral limit imposed
by the Internal Revenue Service. But the TSP is exempt from application of
the actual contribution percentage (ACP) test. The ACP test limits contribu-
tions of highly compensated employees to a specified amount over the con-
tributions of non-highly-compensated employees. The FRTIB argued that
it would be difficult if not impossible to calculate these percentages for the
diverse federal workforce. Congress agreed and exempted the TSP from the
ACP test, arguing that the TSP was inherently nondiscriminatory.
An employee who separates from service can choose to withdraw the
funds, have the TSP purchase an annuity, leave the funds with the TSP, or
roll over the balance to an individual retirement account. An employee who
leaves funds with the TSP can choose, at any time before age 701)2, to with-
draw the account balance, select a life annuity, or receive a series of monthly
payments.
Active employees over age 591h are permitted a one-time withdrawal ofall
or part of their accounts. The TSP does not allow other early withdrawals ex-
cept for hardship, but loans are permitted for any purpose. As of December
1999, there were 616,000 loans with an outstanding balance of $3.0 billion,
or three percent of the total fund.IO Restrictions and taxes on payments are
. the same as those that apply to private sector plans established under section
401(k) of the IRS code (McGill 1996).
Governance oj the TSP. The FRTIB is composed of five part-time presiden-
tial appointees and a full-time executive director selected by those appoint-
ees. Each of these officials is required by FERSA to have "substantial experi-
ence, training, and expertise in the management of financial investments
and pension benefit plans." (5 U.s.C. § 8472(d». The TSP board members
collectively establish the policies under which the TSP operates and furnish
general oversight.The executive director carries out the policies established
by the board members and otherwise acts as the full-time chief executive of
the agency. The board and the executive director convene monthly in meet-
ings open to the public to review policies, practices, and performance. The
National Finance Center of the Department ofAgriculture has been the TSP
recordkeeper, since the fund's creation in 1987 (Mehle 1997).
Costs related to investments are charged against investment return by the
fund manager. As with the retirement system, employing agencies dissemi-
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nate information about the TSP, and funnel agency and employee contribu-
tions to the thrift fund. The Thrift Board deals directly with the current or
former participant on other matters related to the individual's account. TSP
administrative costs are charged to the fund and are offset by account for-
feitures. The gross expense ratio (pre-forfeiture offset) has declined steadily
as the assets have grown, from an average of 0.67 percent of funds in 1988
to 0.07 percent in 1999. After applying forfeiture credits of 0.02 percent,
the net expense ratio was 0.05 percent in 1999. These expenses include the
investment management cost of the C and F fund but they do not include
the administrative costs of the employing agencies.
As an independent entity, the TSP Board is not subject to the normal re-
view and oversight of federal agencies, but the law did provide for continu-
ing audit and review by outside authorities. The board's annual operations
and actions are audited by the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administra-
tion (PWBA) of the Department of Labor and an independent auditor. The
board is also advised by a 14-member Employee Thrift Advisory Council
nominated by employee and retiree groups and appointed by the chairman
of the Thrift Board.
TSP investment policy and process.ll The TSP's investment policy and process
was a subject of extensive discussion when the program was under design.
Much concern centered around the fact that the fund would rapidly grow
to be a major presence in financial markets, and as such, might be used
by the federal government to support policy. For example, analysts worried
that TSP funds might be used to support social policy such as inner-city in-
vestment, or to affect foreign policy, prohibiting investment in corporations
doing business in certain countries.
Another concern centered around the perception of investment choices
in the C fund. Shifts in investments among firms might be viewed as a sign of
insider knowledge about those firms and perceived as manipulation of the
market. Even if the investment shift were made based on public informa-
tion, changes in TSP investment policy could cause much of the market to
follow. These concerns moved Congress to consider approaches that would
protect the plan's investment policy from any influence by federal policy-
makers. One possibility would be to permit individuals to freely select invest-
ments, while another would be to let workers select any qualified institution
to make their investments. The compromise elected for the C fund was to
use a passive "indexed" investment approach that was then beginning to be
popular among governmental and private sector pension funds. Indexed
funds seek to replicate performance of a market index by investing in the
same issues in the same proportion as the index. The proportions are based
on the market capitalization of all outstanding publicly traded shares.
The board selected the Standard and Poor's 500 stock index as the passive
index that would meet the requirements of FERSA; the Lehman Brothers
Federal Civilian and Military Retirement Systems 83
TABLE 3. Annual Yields of Federal Thrift Savings Plan Funds (1988-97)
Year
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Cfund (%)
11.8
31.0
-3.2
30.8
7.7
10.1
1.3
37.4
22.9
33.2
28.4
21.0
Ffund (%)
3.6
13.9
8.0
15.7
7.2
9.5
-3.0
18.3
3.6
9.6
8.7
-0.9
Gfund (%)
8.8
8.8
8.9
8.2
7.2
6.1
7.2
7.0
6.7
6.8
5.7
6.0
Source: U.S. Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (web site).
Aggregate Bond index was selected for the F fund. Asset managers of the C
and F funds are selected through competitive bidding. The current contrac-
tor is Barclays Global Investors (BGI), which invests the C fund assets in the
Barclays Equity Index Fund and the F fund in the Barclays U. S. Debt Index
Fund. The G fund is invested in nonmarketable U.S. Treasury issues similar
to those of the CSRS/FERS fund.
Annual returns on the C, F, and G funds through 1997 appear in Table 3.
The C fund has been the most volatile, and had the highest yield with re-
turns varying from a loss of 3.2 percent in 1990 to a gain of 37.4 percent in
1995. The F fund returns have ranged from a loss of 3.0 percent in 1994 to a
gain of 18.3 percent in 1995. The G fund returns have been steady ranging
from 6.1 percent in 1993 to 8.9 percent in 1990.
Employee participation in the TSP. As of December 1999, there were 1.4 mil-
lion FERS employees eligible to participate in the TSP, of which 86 per-
cent contributed from their own salaries; the remaining 14 percent received
only the mandatory 1 percent federal contribution. There were also 628,000
CSRS employees contributing for a total of 2.1 million contributing partici-
pants as of December 1999. Both the number and the percent of partici-
pants have steadily increased since the first open season in 1987 when only
29 percent of the 563,000 eligible FERS employees were contributing. (TSP
does not track CSRS employees who do not contribute but we estimate that
600,000 eligible CSRS employees do not contribute). Our best estimate is
that 1.9 million of the 2.7 million total eligible employees, or 70 percent, are
participating in TSP. Figure 3 shows the number of participants since 1987
(information from FRTIB website).
The average contribution rate for FERS participants increased from 3.7
percent in 1987 to 6.8 percent in 1997. One-third of the participants contrib-
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Figure 3. Federal employees contributing to TSP. Source: data supplied by the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment
Board.
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ute the full 10 percent, and a fifth contribute the 5 percent needed for the
maximum employer match. Counting those contributing more than 5 but
less than 10 percent, two thirds of FERS participants receive the maximum
5 percent federal contribution. The average contribution rate for CSRS par-
ticipants increased from 3.2 percent in 1987 to 4.4 percent in 1997, with 76
percent contributing the full 5 percent permitted under the plan (FRTIB
1998).
Growth of TSP funds. Figure 4 shows the growth of the TSP fund and its
three accounts since inception. As of December 1999, there was $59.2 bil-
lion invested in the C fund (63 percent), $31.5 billion in the G fund (33 per-
cent), and $4.0 billion in the F fund (4 percent) for a combined TSP fund
of $94.6 billion.
The Military Retirement System
The military retirement system is part of an integrated pay, benefits, and
allowance system used by the Department of Defense (DoD) to recruit, re-
tain, motivate, and ensure a young and vigorous active-duty force. The mili-
tary's noncontributory defined benefit plan is administered and funded by
DoD, and it covers military members of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and
Air Force. It does not include DoD civilian personnel, inasmuch as they
are included in the two federal civilian retirement systems described above.
Most of the DoD's system provisions also cover members ofother uniformed
services including officers of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration (Department of Commerce), officers of the Public Health Service
(Department of Health and Human Services), and the Coast Guard (De-
partment of Transportation). This discussion focuses on DoD's military per-
sonnel, since this group is by far the largest group covered.
Military retirement must be considered as one of many components of
military compensation. Even when the total force size is held constant, II
percent of the active-duty force is replaced per year. Unlike most employers
who hire employees at all ages, new entrants in this system are almost ex-
clusively between the ages of 18 and 22 (with those at the lower ages being
enlisted men and women, and those at the older ages being officers). Most of
the new entrants (67 percent) serve less than six years, taking advantage of
education and other separation benefits designed to recruit and only tempo-
rarily employ these members. The turnover patterns result in a force where
over half of all members have less than seven years of service at any given
time. The average age of the entire active-duty force is 29 (DoD 1998a).
Military benefits. Today's military retirement system for nondisabled re-
tirees provides benefits for active duty personnel retiring after twenty years
of service at any age and for reservists (part-time military members) at age
60 with twenty years of service. The system also provides lifetime monthly
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Figure 4. Growth ofTSP funds. Source: data supplied by the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board.
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disability benefits when a member can no longer fulfill the duties of the job;
it also pays annuities to survivors of those who die on active duty with over
twenty years of service or elect an annuity benefit at retirement.
The military plan is a defined benefit pension, with benefits calculated
as a percent of "basic pay." Though basic pay is the main portion of all
servicemembers' compensation, it is not directly comparable to private sec-
tor earnings. To make such comparisons, one would instead use the concept
of "regular military compensation" (RMC), which includes basic pay, cash
or in-kind allowances for housing and subsistence, and the tax advantage
of these allowances (since they are not federally taxed). Basic pay averages
about 72 percent of RMC (DoD 1998b). Consequently, while it is common
to hear the twenty-year retirement benefit described as "50 percent pay for
life," it is closer to 35 percent (72 percent of 50 percent).
The military retirement system provides an immediate and indexed re-
tirement benefit payable at twenty years of service with no minimum age
limitation. These retirement benefits are generally referred to as "retired
pay," because most retired members are subject to recall to active duty. (The
Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice provides sanctions for the enforcement of
the recall.) Unlike other private and government plans, there is no vesting
prior to normal retirement in a military pension. In fact, only 18 percent
of new entrants complete twenty years of service, but 79 percent of those
with ten years of service stay to twenty years, demonstrating the power of
this retention tool,12
These turnover patterns are the intentional consequence of structured
personnel policies in the military. The need for a young and vigorous force,
the tremendous investment in training, and the near impossibility of replac-
ing military-specific skills at mid-career or late-career make imperative the
careful management of human resources. This explains why numerous re-
views of the military pension system reject the notion of allowing vesting
prior to twenty years ofservice, because of its potentially devastating impact
on retention and force structure (such as the 5th Quadrennial Review of
Military Compensation). Similarly, defined contribution plans are rejected
in the military arena, even though private sector employers have curtailed
or eliminated defined benefit plans in favor ofemployer-subsidized defined
contribution plans to appeal to an increasingly portable workforce. Indeed,
defined contribution plans are seen as a threat to the tremendous retention
power of the current "all-or-nothing" military retirement system.
The fact that the system works is signaled by the fact that more than 60
percent of retirees take the benefit at the first chance they get, receiving
retired pay beginning at an average age of 42. Promotion, policies, assign-
ments, and dedication-complemented by targeted longevity increases,
special pays, and bonuses-allow for the critical retention of selected em-
ployees beyond twenty years of service, but even so, most of these leaders
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leave by thirty years of service, when the retirement system accruals stop
(DoD 1998b).
A bTief history of the military Tetir-ement plans. Most societies devote special
care to those hurt defending the country in battle, and the United States is
no exception. In 1636, the Pilgrims at Plymouth declared that wounded sol-
diers and surviving indigent families would be supported for life. In 1776,
our first national pension law promised 50 percent lifetime pay to the dis-
abled servicemen. Benefits for Navy seamen have been around for many
decades as well (Clark et al. this volume). By 1832, as the numbers of vet-
erans declined and system revenues increased, full pay for life regardless of
need was awarded. All of these disability benefits were administered by bu-
reaus and administrations that were predecessors of today's Department of
Veterans Affairs.
When the Civil War started, there was a need to retire aging military mem-
bers to replace them with a young and active force, and the first major non-
disability retirement act was enacted. This 1861 law separated soldiers after
forty years of service. After the Civil War, Congress enacted legislation to
draw down the force strength by providing retiring officers with benefits
worth 75 percent of pay at thirty years of service (at any age). This funda-
mental design of 2.5 percent accrual per year of service (2.5 percent times
thirty years equals 75 percent) is still the one in effect today. Each subse-
quent war and peacetime period since the Civil War brought expansions
and refinements to the system, and the military has also changed its recruit-
ment policy from time to time, sometimes using a volunteer and other times
using a draft induction system. But for more than a century, retiring service-
members' benefits have been calculated using this same formula.
Between 1920 and 1949, numerous laws shaped the distinction between
disability benefits that continued to be administered by the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA), and separate disability and nondisability benefits trans-
ferred to the Department of Defense as part of the military retirement sys-
tem. No one act clearly defined how these two entitlement systems were to
be separated. The resulting military retirement system includes a lifetime
peTmanent disability benefit that is awarded when the military member cannot
continue to fulfill job obligations. Disability-specific rating scales developed
by the Department of Veterans Affairs are used by DoD to determine the
percentage of disability. Generally speaking, this percentage is multiplied
by basic pay to determine the benefit at the time of separation. This benefit
is indexed to inflation over time.
The disability compensation benefits administered by VA loosely resemble
workers' compensation benefits of the sort designed during the early 1900s.
These are the descendants of the original disability benefits established by
the Pilgrims, and they are not part of the military retirement system. Un-
Federal Civilian and Military Retirement Systems 89
like DoD disability benefits, these benefits do not depend on a worker's
ability to continue service, but rather they are awarded for changes in health
status between entry and departure from the military. VA compensation is
awarded for combat disabilities, other accidents that take place during a
military career, and natural-life diseases acquired in the military (such as
high blood pressure and diabetes). Prior to the Civil War, disability benefits
were mainly combat-related. Because more soldiers died from disease than
any other cause during the Civil War, in 1862 President Lincoln signed an
innovative act that extended compensation to cover diseases incurred while
in service (VA 1994).
The VA disability rating scales are used to determine initial flat amounts
that are then indexed annually to inflation. As veterans age and disabili-
ties worsen, reopened claims can increase monthly benefits. For example,
a 30 percent initial disability benefit for high blood pressure could become
. a 100 percent disability benefit for a heart attack years later. Two out of
every three claims adjudicated within the VA compensation system in 1998
were reopened claims. There were approximately 25 million veterans in the
United States in 1998, and monthly VA disability compensation benefits
were awarded to 2.3 million of them (VA 1994). About one fourth of the VA
disability recipients were also entitled to DoD military retirement benefits
(DoD 1998a).
DoD military retirement system benefits, including nondisability, disabil-
ity, and survivor benefits, are offset for any amounts paid by the VA. How-
ever, since VA benefits are tax-free and can become greater than the DoD
benefit over time, many members apply for both. Approximately 27 percent
of DoD nondisability retirees and 70 percent of DoD disability retirees also
receive VA disability compensation benefits (DoD 1998b).
Military members were brought under social security as of 1957. At that
time, the social security old age, disability, and survivor benefits were simply
added to existing military and VA benefits; no attempt was made to integrate
the two systems. After the draft ended in the mid-1970s, military pay was
increased to ensure that DoD could compete with the private sector for its
all-volunteer force. The end of the draft also forced the military retirement
system to undergo an evaluation, and in 1980 the system was revised for new
entrants. This produced two different retirement benefit structures, one for
those already employed prior to 1980, and another for new hires. After con-
tinued analysis Congress and the administration adopted in 1986 some of
the recommendations of the Fifth Quadrennial Review of Military Compen-
sation,13 changing the system again for new entrants. This process resulted in
the three different retirement benefit structures described above. In 1998,
the services expressed concern with recruiting and retention during an un-
precedented period oflowunemployment. As a result, the National Defense
TABLE 4. Military Nondisability Benefit Formulas (as of February 1999)
Employees entering:
Before 9/8/80
9/8/80-7/31/86
On or after 8/1/86
Name offormula
Final pay
HI-3
Redux*
Base pay used in formula
Basic pay at retirement
Average highest 36
months basic pay
Average highest 36
months basic pay
Factor employed in formula
2.5%/year service capped at 30 yr
2.5%/year service capped at 30 yr
2.5%/year service capped at 30 yr
with 1% penalty for each year
retired under 30 yr
Annual COLA
CPI
CPI
CPI minus 1%
(even after
age 62)
Other
Age 62: one-time
benefit adjustment
to restore the <30 yr
of service penalty
and COLA reductions
Source: Authors' compilation of data supplied by the 000 Office of Actuary.
The President's FY 2000 Budget proposed eliminating the penalty for this population.
*At 15 years of service, participant may switch to HI-3 formula or receive a bonus and stay in Redux.
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Authorization Act for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65) included language that allows
post-1986 members at fifteen years of service a choice between a bonus or
moving to the higher 1980 retirement plan.
Nondisability benefits for active duty personnel. As a result of these changes in
the system rules over time, different benefit formulas apply to the three dis-
tinct populations within the military retirement system. Anyone may retire
at twenty years of service (at any age), and his or her benefit is derived by
multiplying base pay by a total accrual factor. After the initial pay is calcu-
lated, nondisability benefits are then indexed using an annual cost-of-living
adjustment.
The specific benefit accrual factors do, however, differ by date of hire.
Members entering military service prior to September 8, 1980, have an ini-
tial retirement benefit equal to (final basic pay)· (2.5 percent)· (years of ser-
vice). Beginning with members entering military service on September 8,
1980, the average highest thirty-six months of basic pay was used instead of
final basic pay in the initial benefit calculation. Members entering on or after
August 1,1986, were subject to additional changes. There was a one percent
penalty for each year of service under thirty years of service at retirement.
Consequently, a twenty-year retiree has a 50 percent (2.5 percent for twenty
years) total accrual factor reduced by 10 percent, for the ten years of service
not served, to equal 40 percent. In addition, the COLA for these members is
reduced by one percentage point. At age 62, there is a one-time "catch-up"
adjustment in the benefit to reinstate the accrual and the COLA reductions,
but the annual COLA is subject to reductions thereafter. At fifteen years of
service, a member can accept a $30,000 bonus and remain under this plan,
or give up the bonus and move to the higher 1980 benefit levels. This reten-
tion bonus is not considered part of the retirement system, and obligates the
member to serve five more years. Table 4 summarizes the benefit formulas
for the three populations, which are referred to as "Final Pay," "HI-3," and
"Redux" respectively.
The FY 1993 defense authorization act (PL 102-484) included temporary
early retirement authority (TERA) for the military services, as part of an
effort to reduce the size of the active duty force. Unless extended again, this
authority expires September 30, 2001, and it allows the military services to
offer retirement to members with between fifteen and twenty years of ser-
vice. These members receive an immediate annuity calculated normally, but
with 1 percent penalty for each year under twenty years of service. Part or
all of the penalty can be restored at age 62, if the retiree works in a quali-
fied public service job for the period from retirement until twenty years of
service would have been completed. As of September 30, 1998, there were
52,000 TERA retirees receiving $615 million annually (DoD 1998b).
Nondisability benefits for members of the reserves. The Reserve Components of
the Armed Forces include the Army National Guard of the United States,
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the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air
National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast
Guard Reserve. The Ready Reserve is comprised of military members of
the Reserve and National Guard organized in units or as individuals, liable
for recall to active duty to augment the active components in time of war
or national emergency as provided by law (Hunter 1998). Members of the
reserves are part-time military members, and may be fully employed in a
civilian capacity for the federal government or the private sector. These
members may retire after twenty creditable years of service (the last eight
ofwhich must be in a reserve component), but their retirement benefits are
not payable until age 60. The benefit formula is equal to (base pay) * (2.5
percent) * (years ofservice). A member entering military service before Sep-
tember 8, 1980, has a base pay equal to the active duty basic pay in effect
for the reservist's grade and years of service at the time that retired pay be-
gins. A member entering service after this time has a base pay equal to the
average basic pay for the reservist's grade in the last three years in service.
Since reservists are part-time employees, their years of service are calculated
using a point formula that translates effort into years. One point is awarded
for each day of service or drill attended, and fifteen points are earned for
each year's membership in a component. A creditable year is one in which
fifty or more points are earned. While a member must have at least twenty
creditable years to retire, points earned in a noncreditable year are counted
towards years of service. The sum of the points divided by 360 equals the
years of service. For example, a reservist who has 25 years of creditable ser-
vice and 1,500 points in total would have an initial benefit at age 60 oflO.4
percent of base pay (1,500 divided by 360, times 0.025).
Military disability benefits. As stated earlier, military members are eligible
for disability benefits from Social Security, the Department of Veterans Af-
fairs, and the military retirement system. If the disabled member cannot ful-
fill job duties and has at least a 30 percent disability, then a disability annuity
is calculated. If this disability is temporary, then it must be rated at least
50 percent, physical exams must take place every eighteen months, and a
final determination must be made within five years in order to terminate the
annuity or consider it permanent. The annuity is equal to the larger of the
nondisability calculation or the benefit derived by multiplying the percent-
age ofdisability by base pay. Base pay is determined exactly like the base pay
used in the nondisability formula, depending on when the member entered
military service. Federal income taxes do not apply to the part of the annuity
equal to the disability percentage times base pay.
Survivor annuities from the military. At retirement, military members have
the option to have a portion of retired pay continue to their dependents
upon the retiree's death. In return, the member's retired pay is reduced to
cover all or a portion of the cost ofthis benefit. Several design changes have
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altered survivor benefits over time, following its institution in 1953. Between
1953 and 1972, the Retired Servicemen's Family Protection Plan (RSFPP) was
in effect; here members paid the entire cost of this program, as it was not
federally subsidized. However RSFPP came to be seen as both inadequate
protection and too expensive.
Consequently in 1972, the Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) was enacted for
new retirees, and those already retired were given the option to convert to
SBP. The government subsidizes the SBP benefit, directly by paying for bene-
fits in excess of revenues and indirectly by not taxing members' pay directed
towards SBP premiums. Overall, the total subsidy averages about 34 percent
(information from DoD, 1998b). Benefits to survivors are a percentage of the
base amount elected by the retiree; premium reductions are also based on
the elected base amount. This base amount cannot be greater than retired
payor less than $300. As a result of a 1998 law, the retiree pays premiums
for a maximum of thirty years.
SBP annuities are 55 percent of the base amount if the annuitant is under
age 62, and 35 percent of the base amount for older persons. This two-tiered
benefit structure was designed around the concept that the reduction at 62
is offset by social security benefits available at that age. Initially, SBP was
equal to a flat 55 percent for everyone, with benefits offset by social security
at 62; the automatic reduction to 35 percent at age 62 was implemented for
administrative ease. Beginning in 1992, retirees electing the maximum base
amount can eliminate all or a portion of the reduced second tier by paying
the full cost of this added benefit through increased premiums.
Members who die on active duty after twenty years of service are assumed
to have retired on their date of death and to have elected survivor bene-
fits. Just as for retired pay, all SBP annuities are offset by survivor benefits
awarded by VA, but any past retiree premium payments relating to the re-
duction are returned to the survivor. Cost-of-living increases and other ad-
justments are applied as they would have been to the retiree. For example,
a survivor of a retiree under the Redux retirement system would get annual
increases equal to the consumer price index (CPI) minus one percent, and a
one-time catch up to full inflation on the anniversary of the deceased mem-
ber's sixty-second birthday.
Reservists are eligible to elect SBP at age 60 when they begin to draw re-
tired pay. A reservist who accumulates twenty years of service before age
60 can elect to participate in the Reserve Component Survivor Benefit Pro-
gram (RCSBP), which provides survivor benefits in the event ofdeath before
age 60. The added cost of this benefit is fully borne by the member through
future additional reductions in retired pay and survivor annuities.
Cost-oI-living adjustments in military pensions. Prior to 1958, military retired
pay was generally increased by the same percentage as the increase in basic
pay. Since military pay increments exceeded the inflation rate during that
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period, annuity increases were greater than if they had been based on the
CPI. This process was replaced with an automatic mechanism in 1963 that
tied increases to the CPr. Two years later, the COLA formula was altered to
ensure that annuities were increased, whenever the CPI increased by 3 per-
cent. Between 1969 and 1977, each automatic calculation included an addi-
tional one percentage point, designed to make up for a supposed lag be-
tween the calculation of and implementation of the COLA. The designers
did not recognize that compounding of the one percent increases would
soon greatly exceed the effect of a one-time lag. In 1977, the extra percent
was eliminated and cost of living increases were then set for March and Sep-
tember of each year.
Increases to annuities in a public system this large are always vulnerable to
temporary minor modifications in timing and amount, because of the huge
Federal savings that this generates. This occurred in late 1997 to early 1998,
at a time when annuitant payments were running close to $30B annually,
or $2.5B a month. Increasing the monthly checks by 2.1 percent beginning
January 1998, for example, resulted in a monthly increase in spending of$53
million. If legislation had delayed this COLA increase by three months it
would have saved over $150 million in fiscal year 1998. Granting a 1.1 percent
increase instead ofa 2.1 percent increase would have saved over $225 million
in 1998 alone, compounding thereafter. Because several such changes oc-
curred over time, a different strategy was adopted in 1984. At this point the
military and civilian retirement systems adopted the indexing mechanism
used by the social security system. Henceforth, January benefit payments
are increased by the percentage increase in the average of the CPls for July,
August, and September over the averaged CPls for the same three months
of the prior year. Using a common mechanism for indexing all federal plans
has made temporary changes to only one of these plans nearly impossible.
Military systemfinancing. Prior to 1984, the military retirement system was
operated on a pay-as-you-go basis. In other words, there was no trust fund
backing military promises, and the amount paid out to retirees in anyone
year came directly from the DoD budget. To illustrate the impact on DoD
budgets, there were 3,000 military retirees with an annual cost of $3.5 mil-
lion in 1900; by 1984 the number of retirees had risen to 1.35 million with an
annual cost of$16.5 billion- a figure that represented approximately halfof
the military's payroll (DoD 1998a). Projections at the time indicated that re-
tirement outlays would increase to 70 percent of payroll within the ten-year
budget window (DoD 1998b).
The movement toward a funded system began in the mid-1980s. Most fed-
eral pension plans have had to adhere to standardized reporting require-
ments under P.L. 95-595 since 1980. Using an aggregate entry-age normal
cost funding method to value system liabilities, the system actuaries esti-
mated that the normal cost of the system was approximately equal to the
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plan disbursements in FY 1984 (50 percent of basic pay). The decision was
taken to make the switch to a funded plan in 1984 because after that year, re-
tiree payments would begin to increase rapidly over normal cost payments.
Charging DoD with only the accruing liability of the current force would
quickly lower the cost of the retirement obligation in the military budget.
The Military Retirement Fund was therefore created under PL 98-94 to
move the military retirement system from a pay-as-you-go to a funded sys-
tem. It charged the military budget with the accruing retirement cost of the
current active-duty and reserve force using the aggregate entry-age normal
methods. This normal cost is calculated as a percentage of basic payroll and
transferred to the trust fund throughout the year when pay is dispersed. The
law specified that payments on the initial unfunded liability ($529 billion)
would be made to the trust fund at the beginning of each fiscal year from
the General Fund of the Treasury. Payments to amortize annual changes in
unfunded liabilities (for plan amendments, changes in assumptions, and ex-
perience gains and losses) are handled similarly. The legislation passed with
little controversy because it ensured that the defense budget would not con-
tinue to rise due to past manpower decisions, and current manpower deci-
sions could be made with the full knowledge of the cost ofcurrent decisions.
Figure 5 compares the retirement charges to the military budget under
the funded and the pay-as-you-go systems since 1984. Specifically, it com-
pares the normal costs for the method used since 1984 to the plan disburse-
ments as a percentage of basic payroll which was the method used prior to
1984.
DoD's retirement contribution in anyone year includes a full-time normal
cost contribution (for the active-duty force), and a part-time normal cost
contribution (for reservists). The annual full-time normal cost percentage
(NCP) is derived as the weighted average of the NCPs relating to the three
distinct benefit formulas; the weights reflect the percentage of payroll that
year relevant to each of the systems. Since the newer systems offer less gen-
erous benefits, the weighted NCP drops annually. It should also be noted
that half of the basic payroll goes to members with less than eight years of
service, so it does not take long for the budget to noticeably change when
new benefit rules are implemented for new entrants. The annual part-time
NCP is calculated in the same manner as that for full-time personnel.
In FY 1998 the full-time "weighted" normal cost percentage was 30.4
percent and the part-time normal cost percentage was 8.8 percent. These
amounts are obtained by multiplying by the basic pay of their respective
members to determine the amount transferred from the DoD military bud-
get to the trust fund. As shown in Table 5 (DoD 1998b), the total basic payroll
was a little over $37B and the normal cost contributions to the trust fund
were $10.4B in FY 1998-a figure that represented 28 percent of basic pay.
This percentage is smaller than the 1985 original percent (50.7 percent) be-
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Figure 5. Plan costs as percent of basic payroll. Source: data supplied by the Department of Defense.
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TABLE 5. Development ofFY 1998 Full-Time and Part-Time Normal Cost
Percentages
Weighting factors *
Full-time NCP
Part-time NCP
Final pay (%)
17.0
36.7
9.8
HI3 (%)
19.3
33.0
9.3
Redux (%)
63.7
28.0
8.4
Weighted (%)
30.4
8.8
Source: Department of Defense Office of the Actuary (1998b).
*These factors are the percent of basic payroll attributable to members under each benefit
formula.
cause of the introduction of less generous benefits in 1986, and because of
increasing real interest rate assumptions.
The unfunded liability of the system is intended to be paid off in fifty
annual payments, with the last being in year 2033. Changes in unfunded
liability due to benefit formulas, changes in actuarial assumptions, and ex-
perience gains and losses are amortized over thirty years by payments that
increase in absolute value at the same rate as the annual long-term pay scale
assumption (currently 4 percent). Total annual payments on the $496 B un-
funded liability (made by Treasury to the retirement fund) were $15 billion
in FY 1998. Unfunded liability and normal cost payments include the cost
of projected inflation so they are adequate to fund the retirement system
(DoD 1998b).
Each year the retirement fund is credited with normal cost contributions
from DoD, payments on the unfunded liability from Treasury, and invest-
ment income. It pays all benefits to retirees and survivors. Under law, the
assets of the retirement fund are invested in special issue Treasury securi-
ties. bearing interest equal to current market yields for federal securities of
comparable maturities. The fund balance increased from zero at the end of
FY 1984 to $150B at the end ofFY 1998 (five times payments to annuitants).
Governance of military pension plans. The military retirement system is ad-
ministered by the DoD, and trust fund assets are invested by an Investment
Fund Manager employed by DoD. P.L. 98-94 (currently chapter 74, title 10,
U.S.c.) established an independent three-member DoD Retirement Board
ofActuaries. The members each serve fifteen-year terms, and one new mem-
ber comes on every five years (original terms were five, ten, and fifteen in
order to achieve this ultimate arrangement). The DoD chief actuary serves
as the executive secretary of the Board and the Office of the Actuary pro-
vides all technical and administrative support to the board. This support is
proactive in nature instead of reactive, and includes recommendations as
to assumptions and methods. The DoD Office of the Actuary produces all
aspects of the actuarial valuations of the system. It has a valuation model
that produces the normal costs, unfunded liabilities, and open group pro-
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TABLE 6. Military Retirement System: Key Plan Statistics
Total active-duty members and full-time reservists
Total monthly basic pay ($M)
Total selected drilling reservists (part-time)
Total monthly basic pay ($M)
Total number of nondisability retirees
Total monthly retired pay ($M)
Total number of disability retirees
Total monthly retired pay ($M)
Total number of surviving families
Total monthly survivor annuities ($M)
Source: Department of Defense Office of the Actuary (1998b).
1,459,000
$2,850M
817,000
$296M
1,556,000
$2,362 M
111,000
$116M
234,000
$144 M
jection over the next 100 years. Other models allow the office to project the
unfunded liability over time, amortize the payments to the fund, produce a
cash-flow analysis for the DoD investment fund manager to use in determin-
ing investment criteria, and analyze gains and losses. The office produces
military-specific mortality and other decrement rates; analyzes economic in-
dicators and trends that are key to the development of long-term cost-of-
living, basic pay, and trust fund investment income assumptions. Experts in
the office can analyze the effect of any proposed direct change to the sys-
tem, or the effect of indirect adjustments that affect the system (such as pay
or force size adjustments).
The designers of the 1984 funding law realized the importance of inde-
pendence in determining assumptions and methods that significantly affect
the annual costs of the system. To demonstrate this importance, only one
small example need be examined: in fiscal year 1985, we determined that
the DoD military budget could have been lowered by $5 billion by merely
increasing the actuarial assumption for the annual assumed investment in-
come rate by 1 percentage point. The law requires that the Board of Actu-
aries determine valuation methods and assumptions, review valuations of
the system, determine the method ofamortizing unfunded liabilities, report
annually to the secretary of defense, and report to the president and the
Congress on the status of the fund at least once every four years.
Key plan statistics appear in Table 6. There were almost 1.5 million active
duty members, 1.6 million nondisability retirees, 111,000 disabled retirees,
and 234,000 survivors as of September 30,1998.
Future Challenges for Federal Pension Systems
One challenge facing federal pension systems has to do with the way in
which the accounting is handled for federal plans that accumulate, and in-
vest, assets in their fund portfolios. By law, any federal retirement assets
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must currently be invested in U.S. Treasury securities, and these assets are
counted in the government's "unified budget." As a result, only payments
from "outside" sources (e.g., employee contributions) and payments made
to "outside" sources (e.g., annuity benefits) affect the federal deficit. By con-
trast, government payments to federal pension systems do not affect the fed-
eral deficit. One result of this accounting framework is that policy debates
tend to focus on contributions from employees and payments to annuitants,
rather than structural changes such as an increase in retirement age, since
the latter has little or no impact on the measured unified deficit.
To understand how federal pension financing affects the government bud-
get, one first must recognize that an intragovernmental transfer consists of
a debit from one government account and a credit to another. An example
of an intragovernmental transfer is a payment of interest by the Treasury
(debit) to a government pension trust fund (credit). These two transactions
cancel each other out and have no overall effect on the federal deficit. Simi-
larly, the accruing cost of retirement in a federal pension system is charged
against the employing agency (debit), and some or all of these funds are
transferred to the federal pension plan's trust fund (credit). Another federal
entity, such as the Department of Treasury, may be responsible for making
payments on the unfunded liability (debit) to the trust fund (credit). When
the federal pension trust fund receives the income (debit) it invests its assets
in special issue Treasury obligations (credit) bearing interest at rates deter-
mined by the secretary of the Treasury, taking into consideration current
market yields for outstanding marketable U.S. obligations of comparable
maturities. Each year the Treasury pays (debits) interest to the trust fund
(credit). Each of these is an intragovernmental transfer with no effect on the
Federal deficit. Indeed, only payments from the fund to retirees and refunds
of contributions are counted as outlays from the federal budget and hence
affect the deficit level.
Although budget flows are unaffected by the purchase of securities by
a federal pension trust fund, this action does increase the gross federal
debt and the debt subject to statutory limit, specifically the portion of the
debt held by government accounts. The portion held by the public will not
change. But the resultant increase in government debt subject to statutory
limit tends to be small, likely having only a negligible effect on the timing of
the next debt limit increase and the political issues surrounding that legis-
lation.
Consequently, the decision to accumulate assets in a government-run
pension fund has no effect on the annual government deficit, and only a
minor effect on the national debt. From an accounting point ofview, unless
one invests federal pension funds outside the federal government, it is im-
possible to recognize long term liabilities generated within the system. But
investing federal pension assets in capital market assets has been rejected in
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the past by policymakers for many reasons, including (1) the risk associated
with investing pension assets in less secure portfolios, (2) the possibility that
the federal government might exert undue influence over private compa-
nies by virtue of is large holding of stocks and bonds, and (3) the potential
difficulty of convincing the public to buy federal securities when the gov-
ernment invests elsewhere.
Given these complexities, it may be asked why should any federal pen-
sion system prefund or hold assets in excess ofcurrent pay-as-you-go benefit
payout needs? One reason is that adopting a funding policy alerts policy-
makers to the long-term cost or savings implications of proposed bene-
fit changes and unexpected annual experience (inflation, pay increases,
mortality, actual interest income, etc.). These changes are then reflected in
the budgets and integrated into policy and management decisions. For ex-
ample, for many years it was widely believed that the military retirement
system needed to be altered, and furthermore, policy required that benefit
reductions could only apply to new entrants into the military. As a result of
having pay-as-you-go accounting, there was no compelling budgetary rea-
son to implement any changes because it take twenty years before the de-
fense budget would see the result of the policy change. But in 1984 when
DoD moved to an entry-age normal cost funding method, it quickly became
clear that there was a huge cost impact ofchanging benefits for new entrants,
since the majority ofmembers had less than six years ofservice. It took Con-
gress and the administration less than two years after this new funding law
was enacted to implement a totally new retirement system for new entrants.
Another example of the beneficial effect of prefunding is that the long-term
consequences of a federal pay raise are better measured. Focusing only on
current cashflows reveals how a pay raise affects current year federal outlays,
but ignores outyear effects. Of course, most funded plans require agency
contributions that are a percentage of payroll, so a current increase in pay-
roll automatically boosts retirement obligations not only in the first year,
but in future years as well. Hence funding requires proper measurement of
the full cost of federal compensation changes (including in the retirement
benefits).
Another reason to fund a federal pension is that funding affords some
additional security that annuitants will receive promised benefits when due.
One might argue that since funding does not affect the Federal deficit, this
security is apparent rather than real. Of course, the current focus on when
the Medicare and social security trust funds will run dry indicates that voters
and policy experts do perceive some risk associated with the time when out-
lays come to exceed tax receipts.
Other challenges also await the Federal and military pension systems in
the future. Currently a strong economy combined with better financing sug-
gests that these retirement systems are stronger than ever before. But poor
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economic performance could generate pressures from employees, annu-
itants and taxpayers for future benefit and tax changes. For instance, auto-
matic indexing of benefits after retirement is always controversial, and im-
mediate budgetary savings can be achieved through cutbacks in the COLA.
Indeed, FERS already has a "diet" COLA (reduced by 1 percent) and this
may be adopted for CSRS and the military systems in the event of budget-
ary pressures. The federal systems are also likely to respond to current and
future social security reforms. The social security retirement age has already
been raised to 67, which will likely lead to pressure for change in the federal
systems. The age 55 and thirty years of service under CSRS, and for older
FERS employees, is gradually phasing out over time, but there will be pres-
sure to increase the age 57 and thirty FERS provision as well as the age 60
and twenty provision.
Finally, workforce demographics coupled with improvements in medical
care will create important challenges for the federal retirement programs
in years to come. Both the military and civilian systems have diverse dis-
ability programs that should be coordinated more effectively, in order to en-
sure effective use ofdisabled employees and efficient design of the disability
benefit plans. Postretirement medical costs are a major part of the federal
budget and, as yet, have only been estimated approximately but not pre-
funded.14 The TSP thrift plan has been quite popular, and it is seen an effec-
tive element of FERS compensation. But as economic conditions change,
and investment options are expanded, this plan will have to track and incor-
porate responses to these changes.There may be pressure for including mili-
tary personnel into the TSP or an equivalent system in the future, though it is
unlikely that a defined contribution plan would replace the existing defined
benefit model.
Appendix: Postretirement Medical Plans for
Civilian Employees and Military Personnel
While the main focus of this chapter is pension benefits, a brief discussion
of retiree medical benefits is instructive. As above, a wide range of programs
applies to these employees. The federal government does not prefund post-
retirement medical (PRM) benefits. However, federal agencies are required
to report on the PRM liabilities.
Federal civilian employees and their dependents are covered by the Fed-
eral Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP); here, benefits and the
share of contributions after retirement are identical to those that apply to
employees before retirement (with the exception that postal employees are
covered by FEHBP but pay a lower share of the cost of FEHBP than do non-
postal employees). CSRSjFERS employees entitled to an immediate annuity
at retirement and who participated in FEHBP at least five years immediately
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before retirement can continue to participate in FEHBP after retirement.
FEHBP permits retirees to choose among over 300 plans, but the largest
one, a national Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan, covers half of the 1.9M partici-
pating annuitants. Retirees pay one fourth of the cost of most plans but do
bear a higher percentage of the cost of the higher-premium plans. The total
PRM liability was $176B as of September 30,1998, with an annual cost of
$23B. The system is not funded so participants and the government cover
each year's costs (OPM 1999b).
Health care for military retirees and their dependents may be handled
by three health care systems. First, military retirees and dependents can re-
ceive treatment at military hospitals. Second, retirees and dependents lack-
ing access to a military hospital can participate in Tricase, which covered
6.8 million people eligible for current or future benefits in 1995 including
current and former members of the armed forces and their dependents and
survivors. The total unfounded liability was $21OB in 1998 with a current
cost of 13.7 percent of pay for active duty members (Milliman and Robert-
son 1998). The third option open to military retirees is that they are also
eligible to receive treatment from the health care system administered by
the Department of Veterans Affairs.
Notes
1. However, CSRS employees have had two opportunities to elect FERS, and a
1999 change allows military members under the 1986 benefit formulas a choice be-
tween the higher 1980 benefits or a bonus.
2. Federal rules that apply to private sector contributory plans require the em-
ployer to pay the value of any deferred benefit in excess of the value of the refund.
These rules require the former vested employee to be able to redeposit any refund
and regain the prior service credit on return to employment. Both CSRS and FERS
fall short of these requirements on private sector plans.
3. This and other information on CSRSjFERS was provided by the Federal Office
of Personnel Management (OPM 1999a, b). Michael Virga, the Senior Actuary for
Pension Programs ofOPM, kindly provided the authors with additional unpublished
data maintained by the Office of the Actuary of OPM.
4. The information in this section is taken from OPM (1998a) and the OPM web-
site <www.opm.gov>.
5. If the employee is hired after age 38, the minimum benefit is less than 40 per-
cent.
6. The normal cost is the percent of salary that, with interest, will pay the benefits
of new entrants to the retirement plan. The Board of Actuaries determines the nor-
mal cost for a typical recent group of new entrants. This differs from the traditional
approach of determining the cost from entry for all current active participants.
7. The unfunded liability of CSRS is the present value of all benefits for current
active and retired participants less (1) the present value of future employee and
agency contributions and (2) the fund.
8. See Hustead (this volume) for a detailed discussion of CSRSjFERS actuarial
assumptions including illustrative rates.
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9. The government matches 100 percent of the first 2 percent in employee contri-
butions, and 50 percent of the next 3 percent. With the 1 percent automatic contri-
bution, the total government contribution is 5 percent if the employee contributes
at least 5 percent.
10. Personal communication from the Office of External Affairs, FRTIB, 1999.
11. This section draws from Mehle (1997).
12. New entrant projection provided by the DoD Office of the Actuary (personal
communication, 1999).
13. Federal law calls for a Quadrennial Review ofMilitary Compensation (QRMC).
As with the Fifth QRMC, many of the reviews have at least partly focussed on retire-
ment benefits. (DoD 1985)
14. See the Appendix for more discussion of postretirement health benefits for
military and civilian federal employees.
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